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LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN
NEW YORK STATE
SIDNEY H. ASCH

I. INTRODUCTION
Tm differences in population, geography and interests of the
various communities in New York make fair and equitable representation in the legislature a difficult problem. The rules for legislative
representation and establishing senate and assembly districts are set
out in Article III of the New York Constitution.
The Constitution of 1846 gave the state 32 Senators. At that
time each district had numerically even groups of constituents.
Twenty-three came from rural districts, nine from cities. By 1890
the prodigious expansion of cities had reduced the rural districts to
14, and multiplied the number of square miles a country senator had
to cover in performing his duties. In 1894, the entire north country,
a sixth of the area of the state, had one senator while New York
County, including the present Bronx, had 12. The constitutional
convention of that year increased the senate to 50 members, restored
23 rural districts, and provided for extra senators from large population centers, as their growth should warrant.
The Constitutional basis of representation is citizen population as
determined every ten years by the federal census. Since the federal
census does not provide a complete count of non-citizens, the requirement of the New York State Constitution was met by having the
Federal Government ask this special question in the state as part
of the 1950 census canvass.
Senate districts are required to be continuous territory, as compact as possible, and containing as nearly as possible an equal number
of citizens. No county may be divided, except to form two or more
districts wholly within the county. No county may have more than a
third of all senators and no two adjoining counties more than half.
There are other mandatory constitutional provisions. Under the
present apportionment, effective November 1954, there are 58 senators.
The Assembly has a membership fixed by the Constitution at 150.
Every county is entitled to one assemblyman except that Fulton and
SmNzy H. AscHi is Professor of Law at New York Law School and a Member of
the New York State Legislature.
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Hamilton form one district. Assembly seats beyond this minimum
are apportioned "as nearly as may be according to the number" of
their citizens, by another complicated formula. The legislature must
apportion assembly seats among the counties by the same law by
which it revises the senatorial districts. The legislative body of the
county then marks out its assembly districts by the rules given in the
constitution.

II. LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
THE state legislatures reflect many and conflicting ideas in their
modes of apportionment. Although representation of wealth in landed
property, as such, has disappeared, rural areas of many states continue
to be over-represented. Dominance of rural areas has often been given
as the explanation of why the states have not always dealt with the
tremendous problems of urban America, such as housing, municipal
transportation, distribution of essential commodities, social legislation and community planning. The organization of the legislature
often intensifies the conflict rather than encourages the resolution
of the city-country split. The constitutional provisions, the attitudes
of the courts and the dominance of rural areas in the legislatures, all
make change extremely difficult, if not impossible.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PRoVIsIoNs.-Every state has some provision in its constitution for legislative reapportionment. These provisions which are incorporated into state constitutions in one form or
another concern the allocation of seats to districts and the redrafting
of district lines. So far as the Congress is concerned, the allocation
of seats is a function of the national government while the drafting
of district lines is a state matter. In many states, however, the job
of "apportionment", allocation of seats, and redistricting, fixing of
district boundaries, are carried out by the legislative bodies for themselves. The terms "apportionment" and "districting" are treated
synonymously in some jurisdictions. Thus, under the California constitution the term "apportionment" is employed for the creation of
single-member districts. In practice, both the legislatures and the
courts frequently refer to establishment of districts as "apportionment acts."
Any evaluation of the methods of allocating legislative seats,
reapportionment, raises basic questions as to what the bases of repre-
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sentation should be. If the basis is to be population, does this mean
the entire population; citizens, alone; qualified voters, alone; or ratified voters who actually vote, alone? The two most commonly adopted
criteria are "population" and "geographic area."
The most frequently employed test is "population". Surprisingly
enough, it serves as a basis for the allocation of seats in more state
senates than houses of representatives. Since area is generally not
employed alone as a basis but rather together with population it is
less obvious a test. In twenty-four states, the constitutions explicitly
direct that representation in the senate be based on population. In
five1 of these twenty-four states, the population criterion is all but
vitiated by the restrictions placed upon the number of senators in
any district.' In nine other states, the population test is restricted
to some extent by the exclusion of Indians not taxed; aliens; and
military personnel.3 Indiana prescribes adult males as the population
base, 4 and Oregon restricts population to white population. 5 The1 Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Pennsylvania, West Virginia.
2 The references are to articles and sections of the state constitutions: Ark. Const.,
Art. VIII, §§ 1-5; Col. Const., Art. V, §§ 45-49; Conn. Const., Art. II, §§ 3, 4; Ga.
Const., Art. I, § 2, Par. ii, ii; § 3, Par. i; Ill. Const., Art. IV, §§ 6, 7, 8; Kan. Const.,
Art. II, § 2, Art. X, §§ 1-3; Ky. Const. § 33; La. Const., Art. II, §§ 2, 5, 6; Mich.
Const., Art. V, §§ 2-4; Mo. Const., Art. III, §§ 2-11; Nev. Const., Art. I, § 13, Art.
XVII, § 6; N. M. Const., Art. IV, § 42; N. Dak. Const., Art. II, §§ 29, 35, Art. XVIII,
§ 214; Ohio Const., Art. XI, §§ 1-11; Okla. Const., Art. V, §§ 9-16(b); Utah Const.,
Art. IX, §§ 2, 4; Vt. Const., Art. IT, §§ 13, 18, 37; Va. Const., Art. IV, § 43; Wyo.
Const., Art. III, § 3, Art. HI-A, § 204. Five other state constitutions direct that ways
be used as the basis but restrict its effect. They are: Ala. Const., Art. IV, § 50, Art.
IX, §§ 198-203; Fla. Const., Art. VII, §§ 3, 4; and Iowa Const., Art. III, §§ 34, 35
which limits any county to not more than one senator; W. Va. Const., Art. VI, §§ 4-10,
50 which limits any county to two senators; and Penn. Const., Art. II, §§ 16-18 which
limits a city or county to not more than one-sixth of the members of the senate. The
most up-to-date and comprehensive survey of the constitutional provisions relating to
representation and apportionment and their application, is to be found in ZELLER,
A.iaRxcA STATE LEGISLATURES, c. III, 30 (New York, 1954). See, Tn Boox oF TM
STATES, 1950-51 (The Council of State Governments, Chicago, 1950) 121-24. See also,
LASHLEY, REAPPORTIONMENT oF STATE LEGIsL&TUREs-LEGAL REQUnREMENTS, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 364-76 (Spring, 1952).
3 Cal. Const., Art. IV, § 6; Me. Const., Art. IV, pt. I, §§ 2, 3, Art. IV, pt. II,
§§ 1, 2; Minn. Const., Art. IV, §§ 2, 23, 24, scheds. 10, 12; Neb. Const., Art. III, § 5;
N. Y. Const., Art. III, §§ 3-5; N. C. Const., Art. II, §§ 4-6; Wash. Const., Art. II, §§ 3,
6, Art. XXII, §§ 1, 2; Wis. Const., Art. IV, §§ 3-5. Military personnel are excluded
from population in Washington, and S. Dak. Const., Art. III, § 5, Art. XIX, § 2.
4 Ind. Const., Art. IV, §§ 4-6. This was vitiated by the 19th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
5 Ore. Const., Art. IV, §§ 6, 7. The 15th Amendment made this an obsolete
provision.
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remaining jurisdictions use some form of these restrictions-a progressive formula, or the apportionment of one senator to each county.0
Population is also the principal test for representation in the lower
houses. However, many of these state constitutions also contain provisions that make reapportionment very difficult to accomplish. The
constitutions of twenty-one jurisdictions specify population as the basis
of apportionment,7 but nine other states using population restrict
this criterion by excluding aliens, Indians not taxed, or military
personnel." One limits "population" to white population, and one
restricts "population" to adult males.' 0 Twelve other jurisdictions
either permanently describe the distribution of representatives or
provide rigid formulas for reapportionment in their constitutions.'
Massachusetts and Tennessee base their apportionment upon legal
voters, a formula that is somewhat restrictive but more elastic.' 2
Arizona uses "votes cast for governor" at the last preceding election
with the limitation that there may not be a reduction of any district
below its quota based on the 1930 election. 3
In the attempt to prevent gerrymandering, the constitutions of
6 See in particular, Idaho Const., Art. III, §§ 2, 4, 5, Art. XIX, §§ 1, 2; Mont.
Coast., Art. V, § 4; Art. VI, §§ 3-6; N. J. Const., Art. IV, ii, § 1, Art. IV, iii, § 1; S. C.
Cost., Art. I, §§ 1, 2, Art. III, §§ 3-6.
7 Ala. Cost., Art. IX, §§ 198-203; Ark. Const., Art. VIII, §§ 1-5; Col. Const.,
Art. V, §§ 45-49; Ill. Const., Art. IV, §§ 6, 7, 8; Ky. Const., § 33; La. Const., Art.
III, §§ 2, 5, 6; Mich. Const., Art. V, §§ 2-4; Mo. Const., Art. III, §§ 2-11; Mont.
Coast., Art. V, §§ 2-6; Nev. Const., Art. XVII, § 6; N. H. Cost., pt. II, §§ 9, 11, 26;
N. J. Cost., Art. IV, iii, § 1; N. M. Const., Art. IV, § 42; N. Dak. Const., Art. XVIII,
§ 214; Ohio Coast., Art. XI, §§ 1-11; Penn. Coast., Art. II, §§ 16-18; S. C. Coast., Art. I,
§§ 1, 2, Art. III, §§ 3-6; Utah Cost., Art. IV, §§ 2-4; Va. Const., Art. IV, § 43;
W. Va. Const., Art. VI, §§ 4-10; Wyo. Coast., Art. III-A, §§ 2-4.
8 Cal. Cost., Art. IV, § 6; Me. Const., Art. IV, pt. II, §§ 1, 2; Minn. Const., Art.
IV, §§ 2, 23, 24, scheds. 10, 12; Neb. Const., Art. III, § 5; N. Y. Const., Art. III, §§ 3-5;
N. C. Coast., Art. II, §§ 4-6; S. Dak. Coast., Art. XIX, § 2; Wash. Coast., Art. XXII,
§§ 1, 2; Wis. Const., Art. IV, §§ 3-5.
9 Ore. Const., Art. IV, §§ 6, 7. The 15th Amendment made this an obsolete
provision.
-0 Ind. Const., Art. IV, §§ 4, 5, 6. The 19th Amendment made this an obsolete
provision.
11 Conn. Coast., Art. III, §§ 3, 4, amend. II, XV, XVIII, XXXI; Del. Const., Art.
II, § 2; Fla. Const., Art. VII, §§ 3, 4; Ga. Const., Art. III, § 2, pt. ii, iii; pt. i, § 3;
Idaho Coast., Art. XIX, §§ 1, 2; Iowa Const., Art. III, §§ 34, 35; Md. Const., Art.
III, §§ 2, 5; Miss. Coast., Art. XIII, §§ 254-256; Okla. Const., Art. V, §§ 9-16(b);
R. I. Coast., Art. XIII, amend. XIX; Tex. Coast., Art. 11m, §§ 25-26a, § 28; Vt.
Art. II, §§ 13, 18, 37.
Const.,
12
.Mass. Coast., Pt. II, c. I, § III, Art. I, amend. LXXI; Tenn. Const., Art. II,

§§ 4, 6.
13 Ariz. Coast., Art. IV, §§ 2, 1(1).
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many states require that the district be "composed of contiguous
territory" and that all districts "be equal in population as nearly as
may be." But, since the requirement of population equality yields to
other criteria in a number of jurisdictions the population test is not
determinative and the rural areas have more than a proportionate
representation. Provisions qualifying the population test exist in
twenty-six states. In nineteen states, each county is guaranteed at
least one legislator.' 4 In seven other states, the more populated areas
are restricted as to representation. As examples, Connecticut guarantees town representation. The Delaware Constitution fixes the
apportionment permanently. In Maine, no town can have more than
four legislators and in Maryland, the maximum number is fixed at six.
The constitution of Rhode Island restricts the representation of any
town to one quarter of the total membership of the lower house. In
Vermont all towns, regardless of sizes are assured representation.
In New York, no county can have more than one-third of the total in
the senate and every county but two are entitled to at least one assemblyman.
In several jurisdictions, representation in the legislature is based
on the right to vote. Accordingly, in Massachusetts and Tennessee
representation in both houses of the legislature is based on a determination of the total number of the legal votes in that state. In Texas,
senate representation is keyed to the number of qualified electors. The
basis of representation in the Idaho state legislature is the votes cast
in congressional elections. Under the Kansas Constitution, the lower
house must have one member from each county in which at least 250
legal votes were cast for any candidate at the last preceding election.
The official canvass of votes cast for all candidates for governor at the
last election is the basis for the apportionment of the lower house
of Arizona. The senatorial distribution is set out by the constitution of
that state.
Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, and South Carolina prescribed
representation in their senates by using their counties as legislative
units. Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, and to some degree, New
Hampshire, employ their cities and towns as legislative districts.
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont employ towns as a basis
14 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Utah, Wyoming.
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for representation in the lower chamber, and Rhode Island uses them
for election of senators. The state legislatures often fail to reapportion
although their constitutions usually specify a reapportionment after
each federal census. As a result, in Minnesota failure to reapportion
and to redistrict the state has resulted in such wide disparities as one
representative for a district containing 7,254 people and only two
representatives for another district with a population of 128,501.11
In Texas, on the basis of the 1940 census, eleven metropolitan cities
are entitled to one-half the representation in the senate, but actually
they elect slightly over one third of the senators. 16 Another striking
example is California. Los Angeles County, with a population of
2,785,64317 in the 1940 census, has one senator, while the district
consisting of Inyo and Mono Counties, with 9,923 people, has the
same representation in the upper chamber.' In Alabama, where cities
in the northern part of the state had had a sharp population growth
in the last two decades, one district with 140,420 people is represented
by one senator, while another district with only 58,621 also is represented by one senator.' 9 Fulton County, where Atlanta is located,
pays one-fourth of Georgia's taxes, has one-eighth of the state's population, but has only three of 205 legislators in the lower house.
In forty-two jurisdictions the job of reapportionment is the
responsibility of the legislature. When the legislatures fail to take
action, as is often the case, the courts refuse to intervene on the
15 Louis C. DORWEILER, JR., Minnesota Farmers Rule Cities, 35 Nat. Mun. Rev.
116 (1946).
16 MAcCOpRxLE, Texas Reapportionment Problem, 34 Nat. Mun. Rev. 540-543 (1954).
17 McHuzmy, Urban v. Rural In California, 35 Nat. Mun. Rev. 350-354 (1946).
18 FARmER, Legislative Apportionment, 10 (Bur. Pub. Admin. Bull, Univ. Ala.,
1944). See MAcNEI, Urban Representation in State Legislatures, 18 State Government
59-61 (April, 1945). The United States Conference of Mayors in a study in 1949,
entitled, Government of the People, by the People, for the People, points out that while
city peoples constitute 59 per cent of the population, they have only 41 per cent of
the legislators. The study cites further discrepancies: Detroit, with 40 per cent of
the population of Michigan, has only 27 per cent of the representation; Oklahoma
City, with 244,000 people, has seven representatives, whereas seven rural counties with
a total of 57,000 have equal representation; Chicago, with 51 per cent of the population,
has 37 per cent of the representation in the Illinois legislature; Hartford, with 166,000
people, has two representatives, whereas Colebrook, with only 547 people, has the same
number of representatives in the Connecticut lower chamber. These are some of the
glaring examples of inequity indicated in the study.
19 See Colgrove, et al. v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1452
(1946), discussed by FRAxN= L. BuRDEm in The Illinois Congressional Redistricting

Case, 40 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 958-62 (1946). See also SHORT, States that have not Met
their ConstitutionalRequirements, and BoNx, States Attempting to Comply with Reapportionment Requirements, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 377-416 (1952).
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ground that the matter is a political one, not within judicial control °
Of course, once the legislature has reapportioned, the courts can review
the legislative action to see that it conforms to the constitutional
requirements, such as that "counties or towns may not be divided,"
or that "districts must be equal" and "compact." Although the courts,
at times, have shown that they will strike down arbitrary and clearly
political action of districting agencies, such as county commissioners
or city councils, but frequently they will not.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR NEw REPRESENTATION BAsIs.--Obviously,
each house of a two-chamber legislature should have a different representative bases or bicameralism really serves no significant purpose.
Hence it may be argued that to some extent the democratic ideal of
equal representation and our traditional acceptance of bicameralism
are to some extent incompatible.
There are several alternative suggestions for a different basis of
representation for the second chamber. A number of different theoretical possibilities have been advanced. Geography, property ownership, political or governmental units, proportional representation of
political parties, occupational or functional representation, and suffrage
and voting record, rather than just population figures are some of these
suggestions.
(1) Geography as a Basis.-It seems obvious that land should
not be represented simply because it covers area. Yet, acreage is
given preferential treatment in many state legislatures at the expense
of population. Certainly, the use of property or tax-paying as the
basis of representation in an upper chamber in order to make it different from the popular lower chamber, is an anachronism and can
find no rational support. It is a fair conclusion that land and property
cannot be justified as defensible alternative bases of legislative representation.
(2) Political Units.-Although political units seem more logical
than land or wealth as a basis for legislative representation in a senate,
their use presents difficult problems that vitiate their value as criteria
for legislative representation. The nature of the American state governments would seem to render unnecessary the representation of units
20 See, Z aim Am BoNm, The Repea of P.R. in New York City-Ten Years in
Retrospect, 42 Am. Pol. Sd. Rev. 1127-1148 (1948). For cumulative voting in Illinois,
see HytNEmAz An MORGAx, Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 32 li. L. Rev. 12-31 (1937),
and BLAiR, Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 42 Nat. Mun. Rev. 410-14 (1953).
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of local government as such. This is especially so since counties
and towns as units of local government have largely lost some of
the importance they once had as units of local government. They
have given way to larger areas or sections of the states for the performance of governmental functions.
Local units of government are employed as criteria principally
for purposes of legislative representation in three ways: equal representation of counties, especially in the senate; or unequal representation of counties in the senate according to population (several states
also follow the same proportionate distribution for their lower chambers 21 ) or representation based upon towns. 22 However, the local
government unit has not proved satisfactory as a basis of representation, perhaps because it tends to accentuate rivalries, and make the
state assembly the arena for local disputes. Representation based on
the theory of representation of local units of government starts with
the idea that state government is a federation of local governments
and the attitude that this unit of government is the heart of the democratic system. The practice of assuring representation to each county
can lead to many problems. Thus, under the Kansas Constitution, the
House of Representative is limited to 125 members. While each of
the 105 counties is guaranteed one representative, only twenty seats
are Available for distribution upon the basis of population, yet the constitution requires reapportionment every five years. Reapportionment
of the entire state according to population is impossible there. Small
counties are always over-represented and large ones under-represented.
The use of local government as a criterion for representation in
the state legislatures has declined greatly in the last century. Whenever local units are not stipulated as legislative districts by constitution
or statute, the legislature is empowered to divide the state into legislative districts. Ordinarily, the apportionment is restricted not only
by a prohibition against gerrymandering, but also by specific instructions for drawing district lines. The drafting of district lines is quite
a technical problem, but its political aspects presented as a contest
for power always receive publicity. The party out of power is ever
eager to object to any deviation from old district boundaries as an
21

E.g., The case of Florida and Georgia.

E.g., as in some New England states, ranging from little regard for the population factor in Connecticut to increased representation according to population based
22

upon a formula in New Hampshire.
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example of gerrymandering. In some states this comes with such
frequency that those voters desiring peace at any price can be misled
into thinking that the district system is at fault and that a return to
local units of government would prevent friction and gerrymandering.
Actually, abuses in redrafting district lines are a negligible evil in
comparison with the silent gerrymandering of constitutional allocation
of seats to local units, through which depopulated rural local governmental areas retain representation they do not deserve. In too many
instances, moreover, such undeserved power has been used against
the newer and more populous urban communities.
So far as the mechanical aspects of redrafting district boundaries
are concerned, where legislative districts consist of combinations of
counties and where no counties may be cut across in the laying out of
such districts, the problem often arises of what should be done with
fractional remainders of representative population over and above the
average constituency for the state. These remainders may have to be
disregarded, or they may be combined into large flotorial districts as
in Texas, or provided for by other devices. If the drafting of district
lines is to result in districts of approximately equal population, fairly
complex mathematical problems are sometimes presented, when a
heavily populated county is to have more than one representative,
other questions arise. One problem that presents itself in this situation is whether these representatives should be elected at large within
the entire county. It might be treated as if each seat is to be voted
upon separately by the county voters, or, the county may be divided
into representative districts if authorized by the state constitution.
Or a system of proportional representation might be used. These are
some of the alternatives.
(3) Legislative Districts.-The use of the political unit as a
reapportionment measure has not worked out. It tends to unduly
build up the importance of local units of government as against the
growing importance of the entire state. In the newer state constitutions the political unit as a basis of representation has been abandoned
in favor of districts having boundaries drawn with a view to simplicity and fairness. The problem, of course, is to find a device that can
operate to keep the allocation of members to districts abreast of
population shifts. The proposal is made in the National Municipal
League's Model State Constitution that large legislative districts with
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a fluctuating membership be elected by a system of proportional representation. Most states, however, allocate seats to districts on some
formula based on a division of the number of the total population
by the available seats in the legislative house in question. After the
quota is established in this way, it becomes the task of the legislature
or some administrative agency to draft the boundary lines in accordance with it. In some jurisdictions the practice is followed of
creating large districts so as to permit election of two or three representatives. The rationale is that the large district will more likely
reflect the interests of the entire state rather than those of purely
local nature.
In a two-house legislature large districts with a number of
representatives might seem to provide the contrast between the Senate
and the House. Such districts should be of equal population, but so
chosen as to take into consideration present economic regions of the
state. A system of voting for specific places could be used or proportional representation could be provided for in the election within each
district. It is urged that this would contain the values of a modified
functionalism and proportional representation with representation
based on population.
(4) Functional and ProportionalRepresentation.-It also has
been suggested that improvement of representation may come from a
switch to either functional representation based on occupation or to
one of the different types of proportional representation. Functional
representation based upon the underlying idea that the different
interests within the modern state are entitled to be represented within
the agencies of government on the basis of economic or social functions
or occupational enterprises or status. Proportional representation rests
upon the idea that every political faction or party should have the
same percentage of membership in the assembly as the group or party
has in total membership throughout the state.
The whole concept of functional representation has lost its force
by its failure in the Italian fascist state. There are inherent difficulties in its application which render it highly impractical. Smallness
of functional specializations would vitally affect the size of chambers.
Functional representation might work on the level of larger interest
groupings, but the problem of reapportionment of seats among constantly changing functional groupings would seem to be impossible.
It is quite possible that functional representation could be gerry-
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mandered more than district lines. The democratic ideal of representation of population might be lost by the use of this base. Finally, the
use of functional representation overlooks the fact that the citizens'
concern with the state and the state's impact on the citizens is far
more extensive than simply economic, relating to his occupation or
business concern, but affects the totality of his life.
In spite of the limited use of proportional representation systems
in this country, it certainly deserves consideration for either a unicameral or bicameral legislature. The closest approach to proportional
representation for a state legislature in the United States is the cumulative voting for state legislators in Illinois, although it is not a perfect
example. Since it aims to provide representation for political minorities it shares the objectives of proportional representation. Under the
Illinois system, each voter is permitted three votes. He may cast
them for a single candidate or divide between two or three candidates.
Although this system helps the minority party it does not actually
give splinter parties their proportionate representation. Constitutional obstacles to proportional representation exist in a number of
states. An extensive and long term program of voter education would
have to be undertaken in most states to prepare the way for the
consideration of any form of proportional or minority representation.
Furthermore, there are some serious objections which have been advanced against proportioned representation. The first is that it does
not work too well for use in a country where the two-parts system is
so deeply ingrained. Certainly, its history in some European countries
does not help its cause.
In the United States, its abandonment in several cities after it
had been used in the election of city councils, has not encouraged more
extensive use. Because of its complexity and inappropriateness to the
two-party system, there has been little effort made to employ it here.
It is regarded as a foreign scheme as well as one subject to strange
results and to manipulation on the part of those handling the election
machinery. 3
C. APPORTIONMENT BY AGENcY.-It has been contended that
most problems of representation in state legislatures could be avoided
For an excellent list of references on reapportionment methods see ZELLER,
STATE LEGiSLATuREs, c. 3 (New York, 1954) ; Bmx=AD, Legislatures Continue
to be Unrepresentative, 41 Nat. Mun. Rev. 523-525 (1952), and Researchers Probe
Legislative Problems, 42 Nat. Mun. Rev. 254 (1953).
23
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if reapportionment could become automatic and removed from political -party influence. The closest approach to an automatic system
exists in Arizona. There the secretary of state is required to certify
the number of members of the House who are to be chosen from each
county at the next succeeding election. There one representative is
allotted to a county for each 2,500 votes or major fraction thereof
cast in that county for all gubernatorial candidates at the last general
election, subject to the proviso that at no time may this number be
less than that allotted upon the effective date of this constitutional
amendment in 1930. As a result, in Arizona, an automatic reapportionment occurs every second year upon the basis of the vote cast for
governor. While this is not the automatically spontaneous type of
apportionment that occurs under most systems of outright proportional
representation, nevertheless, it is more sensitive than the type of apportionment that exists in most states. Under the Arizona system the
problem of the apportioning agent is broken by removing legislative
control entirely, and in effect by vesting the apportioning function
with the voters themselves.2 4 Consideration might well be given to
this Arizona practice and a review made of the results, as well as
attention given to the possibility of further employment of this device
of allotting legislative seats upon the basis of votes cast.
The constitutions of forty-two states specifically provide that
the legislature shall be the apportioning agency. Thirty-nine of these
jurisdictions make the legislature the sole agency. Oregon provides
that the number of members of her legislature be fixed by law. Tennessee simply directs that the personnel of her legislature shall be
apportioned. Idaho and Nevada make specific enumerations of the
number of districts and legislators in their constitutions, which allocations may not be changed except by law. In New York and Oklahoma
the authority to apportion rests with the legislature subject to review
in the courts at the suit of any citizen. Delaware alone of all the states
retains actual constitutional apportionment.
Many states use special agencies to accomplish their actual apportionments. California has a reapportionment commission consisting of the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the secretary of
state, the controller, and the state superintendent of education. This
24

See BoNE, op. cit., supra, for a discussion of the automatic features in Missouri,

Ohio, and Massachusetts.
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body must complete the apportionment in the event that the legislature
fails to do so. Bodies with similar authorization and with differing
personnel exist in South Dakota and Texas. In other states the actual
apportionment is made by a special body. Ohio uses a commission
composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and the state auditor;
action by this agency is supposed to follow each federal census and
may be taken by any two of these officials. Arkansas created a special
board of apportionment in 1936 consisting of the governor, secretary
of state, and the attorney general.
Missouri devised a widely proclaimed method of apportionment
in its constitution of 1945. In that year it created an apportionment
commission of ten members to reapportion senate seats. This body
was to be selected from lists of ten nominees proposed to the governor
by the state committee of each of the two major political parties
casting the highest vote for governor at the last preceding election
for that post. This commission must complete its apportionment and
file a report within six months after it is called into action, or the
selection of the entire senate, now numbering thirty-four, reverts to
general election from the state at large. For the House the secretary
of state is charged with the responsibility of apportionment in accordance with a formula set in the constitution. Missouri in this way
has recognized that reapportionment for both houses is a task that
lies outside the legislature itself.
The presumed frequency of reapportionment varies considerably
among the states, both in law and in practice. In most states reapportionment does not come more often than every ten years, although
Kansas provides a minimum of five years and Indiana a minimum of
six years between reapportionments. In some states it is not to take
place more often than once in ten years, and in others there is a
specific constitutional mandate to reapportion once every ten years.
States vary, too, in the use of the federal census as the basis for
reapportionment; a few prefer their own census. Reapportionment
should be required soon after the census figures are made available,
but some states do not insist on this point. 5
25 Although reapportionment is required every five years in Kansas, no real reapportionment has been made since 1909. Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
Tennessee, and Virginia specifically require a lapse of ten years between apportionments.
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin require an apportionment after each federal census. Nebraska
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The legislatures themselves are charged with the responsibility for
reapportionment in forty-two states. Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, and
Ohio alone provide some other agency for this function. No provision
is made at all in Delaware, since legislative districts are fixed in the
constitution. California, South Dakota, and Texas provide for reapportionment by an ex officio committee when the legislature fails to
carry out its function. A special session may be called in Florida by
the governor, and legislative reapportionment is subject to review
by the courts in New York. However, these are legal provisions more
often observed in the breach, especially in those states where the
legislature is the reapportioning and redistricting agency. Specifically,
it may be said at this point that reapportionment is a mere mathematical computation easily assigned to administrative bodies, for there is
little possibility for discretion. Redistricting is the application of the
formula to a geographical area, and discretion may be kept to a minimum by adequate standards. Certainly reapportionment is a difficult
matter for the legislators who may wish to protect their own interests.
As an administrative function it would become more or less automatic,
as in the case of reapportionment for the lower chamber of Congress.
Because of legislative control of this function, the legislatures of Alabama and Illinois have not been reapportioned since 1901.20 Although
these are extreme cases, failure to reapportion fully after a census is
applies this rule with the reservation that such revision of the distribution of legislative
seats shall not be made oftener than once in ten years.
A number of states requiring ten-year reapportionment also enjoin that reapportionments be made at the first session of the legislature after the completion of the federal
census. These states are California, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina,
and Connecticut. South Dakota provides that reapportionment is to be made at the
first regular session of the legislature after each enumeration by the United States or
by the state itself.
Massachusetts requires a reapportionment after each decennial state census on the
basis of the number of qualified electors. In Oklahoma reapportionments are to be
made after each decennial census of the United States unless the legislature directs
otherwise. Maine provides for reapportionment after each state census. Oregon specifies
that apportionment shall follow any enumeration, state or federal, and that it be
done at the next legislative session. New Hampshire distributes the seats in her house
of representatives after the last general census of the state, whether carried out under
her own authority or that of the United States. Rearrangement of the senate of New
Hampshire may come from time to time. Seats in the lower house of Rhode Island are
redistributed after each new census taken by either the national or state government;
her senate may be reapportioned after any presidential election. Colorado, Iowa,
Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming call for reapportionments
after any decennial census by any government.
26 A constitutional amendment (pending in 1953) provides for a commission
appointed by the Illinois governor to apportion if the legislature fails to act.
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the rule and not the exception for too many of our states. Twenty-six
states reapportioned one or both houses to some extent after the census
of 1940. By the end of 1953, six additional states made substantial or
minor changes based upon the 1950 census.17 The remaining sixteen
have legislatures that they call "representative bodies," with representation based upon census figures of twenty, thirty, and in some
cases more than forty years ago. If our state legislatures had been
reapportioned periodically and systematically, direct legislation would
not be so necessary. It does not come as a total surprise, therefore,
that in many of the jurisdictions where there has been a definite
reluctance to reapportion, each election ballot is cluttered with initiated
and referred measures-apparently the only course open to the underrepresented populous and urban areas for securing needed services
and social legislation.
III. LEGAL BASIS FOR APPORTIONMENT IN NEW YORK
THE New York State Constitution requires that after each federal
decennial census, the Legislature shall readjust and alter the Senate
districts and by the same law reapportion the members of the Assembly. These constitutional provisions are set out in Sections 4 and
5 of Article III of the Constitution which respectively read, in part,
as follows:
"1... At the regular session in the year nineteen hundred thirty-

two, and at the first regular session after the year nineteen hundred
and forty and after each tenth year therefrom the Senate districts shall
be readjusted or altered, but if, in any decade, counting from and including that which begins with the year nineteen hundred thirty-one,
such a readjustment or alteration is not made at the time above prescribed, it shall be made at a subsequent session occurring not later
than the sixth year of such decade, meaning not later than nineteen
hundred thirty-six, nineteen hundred forty-six, nineteen hundred fiftysix, and so on; provided, however, that if such districts shall have
been readjusted or altered by law in either of the years nineteen
hundred thirty or nineteen hundred thirty-one, they shall remain
unaltered until the first regular session after the year nineteen hundred
forty....
27 The states that reapportioned one or both houses after both the 1940 and 1950
censuses were Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia,
and West Virginia. In November, 1953, New York approved a new apportionment bill.
In 1950 Maryland froze the number of members of the lower chamber at 123 by a
constitutional amendment.
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"The members of the assembly shall be chosen by single districts
and shall be apportioned by the legislature at each regular session at
which the senate districts are readjusted or altered, and by the same
law, among the several counties of the state, as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding

aliens.... "
The Constitution also provides that the readjustment and alteration of senate districts and reapportionment of assembly districts
shall be based upon the decennial federal census. This constitutional
requirement is found in Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
and provides as follows:
"Except as herein otherwise provided, the federal census taken
in the year nineteen hundred thirty and each federal census taken
decennially thereafter shall be controlling as to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the purpose of the apportionment of members of assembly and readjustment or alteration
of senate and assembly districts next occurring, in so far as such
census and the tabulation thereof purport to give the information
necessary therefor. .. "
In 1949, prior to the taking of the 1950 federal decennial census,
representatives of New York State conferred with officials of the Census Bureau at Washington regarding the method of taking a census
of the citizen population of the state and also with regard to the taking of a census of the whole number of inhabitants and the citizen
population for certain city and town blocks and certain towns.
The census representatives advised that since the federal law
contained no requirement that the citizen population be separately
shown it was the plan of the bureau to determine the citizen population of the State and of its subdivisions by means of a 20 per cent
sample. The state Committee on Reapportionment decided that an
actual census of the citizen population of the State and of its subdivisions should be taken. Accordingly, a contract was entered into with
the Bureau of the Census for such census enumeration. The cost to
the State of obtaining this complete census of citizen population was
$200,000. A further contract was entered into with the Bureau for
a census of the whole number of inhabitants and citizen population
of certain city and town blocks and of certain towns.
A. READJUSTMENT OF SENATE DisTRIcTs.-The readjustment
of Senate districts involves two problems: the first is to determine
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the total number of Senate districts; the second is the mode of establishing such Senate districts.
(1) The Number of Senate Districts.-ArticleIII, Section 2 of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
"The senate shall consist of fifty members, except as hereinafter
provided."
The exception referred to is found in Section 4 of Article III of
the Constitution. It provides as follows:
".... The ratio for apportioning senators shall always be obtained
by dividing the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, by fifty and
the senate shall always be composed of fifty members, except that if
any county having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional senator or senators,
such additional senator or senators shall be given to such county in
addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number of senators shall
be increased to that extent."
These provisions of the Constitution have been interpreted by
the Court of Appeals in a number of cases.2" In accordance with the
rules laid down by the Court of Appeals in these cases, the following
is the formula which is used to determine the whole number of
senators.
The citizen population of the State is divided by fifty to obtain
the ratio for apportioning senators. Each county having three or more
full ratios is allotted a senator for each full ratio. The number of
senators so allotted to each such county is then compared with the
number given it in the Constitution of 1894 and any increase resulting from such comparison is added to fifty to give the whole number
of senators. Where a county has been divided since the adoption of
the 1894 Constitution the number of senators allotted on the ratio
to the counties comprising substantially the same territory as was contained in such original county is compared with the number of senators
given such county in the Constitution of 1894 and any resulting increase is added to the whole number of senators.
The Court of Appeals in the Matter of Dowling, 9 has stated this
28 See People ex rel. Henderson v. Supervisors of Westchester, 147 N. Y. 1, 41
N. E. 563 (1895); Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E. 124 (1900),
Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 430, 96 N. E. 87, 96 N. E. 430 (1911); Matter of
Dowling, 219 N. Y. 44, 113 N. E. 545 (1916); Matter of Fay, 291 N. Y. 198, 52 N. E.
2d 197 (1943); Matter of Fay, 306 N. Y. 938, 120 N. E. 2d 215 (1954).
29 Matter of Dowling, supra note 28.
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interpretation of the constitutional provisions regulating the number
of senators is in accord with the intent of the convention which
adopted the 1894 Constitution. That intent was to protect the interests
of rural areas against the rapidly growing cities.30 At this late date
it seems unlikely that these cases will be overruled by the Court of
Appeals.
According to the 1940 census the citizen population of the State is
14,203,449. Dividing that by 50 gives a ratio of 284,069. Upon the
basis of that ratio Kings County has a citizen population entitling it
to nine senators; New York, a citizen population entitling it to six
senators; Bronx, a citizen population entitling it to four senators;
Erie, a citizen population entitling it to three senators; Queens, a
citizen population entitling it to five senators, and Nassau, which was
a part of Queens County at the time of the adoption of the 1894 Constitution, a citizen population entitling it to two senators. Comparing
the number of Senators to which each of these counties is entitled
on the ratio on the present apportionment with the number allotted
it by the Constitution of 1894, gives Kings County an increase of two
and Queens and Nassau Counties, which constitute substantially the
same territory as Queens County in 1894, an increase of six, a total
increase of eight, which gives a Senate of 58.
(2) Readjustment of Senate Districts.-In connection with the
readjustment of Senate districts the Constitution lays down, for the
guidance of the Legislature, certain rules which are found in Article
III, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Reapportionment Commission
has taken the position that certain of these are mandatory and certain
discretionary. The Commission is dominated by the Republican Party.
Under the analysis of the Commission the following rules are mandatory and permit no exercise of discretion on the part of the Legisla31

ture.

1. Each district shall at all times consist of contiguous territory.
2. No county shall be divided in the formation of a Senate
District, except to make two or more Senate Districts, wholly within
such county.
3. No town, except a town having more than a full ratio of
30 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.
Leg. Doc.
(1953), No. 98, pp. 8-9.
31 Ibid., cf. Report and Opinion of Joint Legis. Comm. on Reapp., Leg. Doc.
(1942). No. 59.
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apportionment and no block in a city enclosed by streets or public
ways shall be divided in the formation of a Senate District.
4. No district shall contain a greater excess in population over
an adjoining district in the same county than the population of a town
or block therein adjoining such district.
5. No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall
have a full ratio for each senator.
6. No county shall have more than one-third of all the senators.
7. No two counties or the territory thereof as now organized
which are adjoining counties or which are separated only by public
waters, shall have more than one-half of all the senators.
Under its analysis the following rules are not mandatory and
involve the exercise of some discretion on the part of the Legislature.
1. Each Senate District shall contain as nearly as may be, an
equal number of inhabitants, excluding aliens.
2. Each Senate District shall be in as compact form as practicable.
3. Counties, towns or blocks which from their location may be
included in either of two districts, shall be so placed as to make said
districts more nearly equal in number of inhabitants, excluding aliens.
Where a conflict arises between rules that are mandatory and
those that involve discretion, the rules involving discretion must, of
course, yield to the mandatory requirements of the Constitution.
Where two rules involving discretion conflict, or where two rules
that are mandatory conflict, the choice of the rule to be followed
rests with the Legislature.3 2 Even a cursory examination of the figures
and the geography demonstrates how these principles have been used
to maintain control by the dominant party.
B. REAPPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS OF AssEMBLY,--Section 2
of Article III of the Constitution provides that the Assembly shall
always consist of 150 members. Section 5 of Article III of the Constitution provides that the members of the Assembly shall be apportioned
among the several counties of the State at each regular session at
which Senate Districts are readjusted or altered and by the same law.
This section prescribed the method of apportioning members of the
Assembly as follows:
The ratio for apportioning members of the Assembly is obtained
by dividing the citizen population of the State by 150. One member
32 Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, supra note 28, at 211.
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is apportioned to every county which has a citizen population of less
than one and one-half times the ratio. Fulton with Hamilton is taken
as one county. Two assemblymen are apportioned to every other
county. The remaining members of the Assembly are apportioned
to the counties having a citizen population of more than two full
ratios. Members apportioned on remainders are apportioned to the
counties having the highest remainders in the order thereof respectively. No county is given more members of the Assembly than a
county having a larger citizen population.
The citizen population of the State is 14,203,449. Dividing that
figure by 150 results in a ratio of 94,690. One and one-half times that
ratio is 142,035 and twice that ratio is 189,380. To each of the 45
counties (including Fulton and Hamilton as one county), having a
citizen population of less than one and one-half times the ratio, one
assemblyman is apportioned. Two assemblymen are apportioned to
each of the other 16 counties in the State. This leaves 73 members of
the Assembly to be apportioned to the counties each of which has a
citizen population of more than twice the ratio.
The Constitution does not prescribe the precise formula to be
used in apportioning these additional members of the Assembly.
Several formulas for this apportionment have been suggested. Only
one, the Brown Formula, has ever been used. This formula was employed by the Constitution of 1894 and in each valid reapportionment
made thereafter. Its use was approved by the Court of Appeals in
Matter of Dowling and Matter of Fay."3 The application of the Brown
Formula is as follows:
From the citizen population of each county having a citizen population of more than two ratios, two ratios are deducted. The results
are added and divided by seventy-three, the remaining number of
assemblymen to be apportioned to those counties to give a second
ratio. This second ratio is then divided into the citizen population
of each such county less two ratios and a number of assemblymen
equal to the resulting whole number is apportioned to each such county. Any assemblymen then remaining unapportioned are apportioned
to the counties having the highest remainders and in the order thereof.
33 Matter of Dowling, supra note 28; Matter of Fay, supra note 28. Cf. Matter
of Richardson, 307 N. Y. 269, 121 N. E. 2d 217 (1954).
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IV.

RURAL-URBAN CONFLICT OVER REPRESENTATION
AND APPORTIONMENT

TnE conflict over legislative representation in New York is a
basic manifestation of the power struggle which has continued for
more than a century between New York City, dominated by one
political party, and the rural areas of the state, dominated by the
other.3 4 More than 50% of the state's population lives within the
boundaries of New York City. At the same time, its representation
in the Legislature is approximately 43.1% in the Senate and 43.4%
in the Assembly. A typical example resulting from the last reapportionment of Senate districts35 is the following: In the 26th, 27th

28th, and 29th Senate Districts located in the Borough of the Bronx,
New York City, where the Democratic Party predominates, each
district has a Senator for 344,540 citizens. Immediately outside New
York City, in Westchester County, where the Republican Party is in
power, the 30th, 31st and 32nd Senate Districts each has a Senator for
200,560 citizens. Representation of the upstate districts, which is
largely Republican, ranges from one Senator for 146,666 citizens
in the 39th Senate District to one for 191,438 citizens in the 53rd
Senate District." The 7,250,000 citizens of The Bronx, Kings, New
York and Queens Counties are limited to 24 Senators. But the 6,960,000 who live in the rest of the State have 34 Senators. Bronx County
has only one Senator for each 344,000 citizens while two Senators
represent the 334,000 citizens of Onondaga County.
From the earliest history of the State of New York, a variety
of devices .have been used to maintain the preponderance of legislative power in favor of the rural communities and to the disadvantage
of the City of New York.3 7 Under the 1777 Constitution, for instance,
only freeholders could vote in a senatorial election, 3s---a restriction
34 Neither the conflict nor the problem are unique to New York. See ZELR,
AamucA
STAT LEGISLATuREs, c. 1, 30 (New York, 1954), commented on in N. Y.
Times, p. 1, col. 6 (Feb. 26, 1954); CREE'c, INFLATION IN YouR BALLOT Box, 207
Harper's Mag. 66 (Aug., 1953).
35 N. Y. Laws 1953, c. 893.
86 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment. Leg. Doc.
(1953), No. 98, p. 809.
7 The problem of municipal home rule walks hand-in-hand with the problem
of legislative apportionment and representation. See, e.g., AscH, Municipal Home Rde in
New York, 20 Brooklyn L. Rev. 201 (1954); R cHrAND, Constitutional City Home Rule
in New York, 55 Col. L. Rev. 311 (1953), 55 Col. L. Rev. 598 (1955).

38 N. Y. Const., §§ X, XII (1777).
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which effectively discriminated against city-dwellers, who in general
were not landowners. Martin Van Buren, urging the repeal of this
provision and for the greater extension of suffrage, said:
".. . the city of New York alone pays taxes on $69,000,000,

being $27,000,000 more than the whole eastern district-$24,000,000
more than the middle district-and $14,000,000 more than the western
district. And yet the western district sends nine senators, the middle
nine, the eastern eight, and the city of New York ONE."30
In the same constitutional convention of 1821, Chancellor James
Kent spoke out strenuously in favor of the existing order of things.
He declared:
"In the hands of moderate and moral farmers liberty was not
likely to be lost.... It is to protect this important class of the community that the senate should be preserved. It should be representative of the landed interests and its security against the caprice of the
motley assemblage of paupers, emigrants, journeymen, manufacturers,
and those indefinable classes of inhabitants which a state and a city
like ours is calculated to invite. This is not a fancied alarm. Universal suffrage jeopardizes property, and puts it into the power of
the poor and profligate to control the affluent .... What has been the

progress of the City of New York? In 1773, it contained only 21,000
inhabitants; in 1821, 123,000 souls. It is evidently destined to become the London of America; and it is no hazardous prophecy to foretell, that in less than a century that city will govern the state. And
can gentlemen seriously and honestly say, that no danger is to be
apprehended from those combustible materials which such city must
ever enclose. Shall every department of the government be at the
disposal of those who are often ignorant of the importance and nature
of the right they are authorized to assume? The poor man's interest is
to expect of
always in opposition to his duty; and it is too much
4
consulted."
be
not
will
interest
that
human nature,
39 CLARKE, REPORT OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, 1821, 132
(1821).
40 Id. at 115-116. The remarks of a delegate from Albany County speaking against

a proposal for universal suffrage are noteworthy:
"If the report be adopted, I hold that it will be one of the most aristocratic acts
that has ever been recorded in this state. It will be turning over the votes of a great
portion of manufacturers-day laborers, poor mechanics, etc., into the bands of the
rich man who feeds and employs them. It is not necessary -that either force or corruption should be used; but the influence which the employer possesses, arising from the
dependence of him who seeks to be employed, is sufficient to prostrate our republican
institutions, and to raise up a deplorable aristocracy in our state." Id. at 194.
The ill-feeling of some rural areas toward New York City persisted through the
century. Thus one of the upstate delegates to the 1894 Constitutional Convention
referred to New York City's population as "a sewer of ignorance and corruption
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Governor Lucius Robinson in 1877 bitterly pointed out the relationship between the home rule movement and the perpetuation of
disproportional representation. In, vetoing a bill passed by the Legislature which sought to reorganize the government of New York City,
he stated:
"If local self government is more than an empty name, such
legislation should not be. Were there no other argument against the
bill than this, a sense of duty to the principles of popular representation and the Constitution I am sworn to follow, would forbid my
approval of this or any similar measure forced on an unwilling people
whose proper voice is silent in the legislative halls. I cannot admit the
right of the Legislature to regulate the municipal affairs of New York,
while refusing it its fair apportionment of members in either house.
"Twenty years ago the experiment was undertaken of withdrawing from the city of New York the powers of local government
which it held under its charter, and supplying their place with acts
of the State Legislature. The history of this legislation is, with few
exceptions, one long record of confusion, robbery and wrong."'"
The problems generated by disproportional representation early
gave rise to home rule sentiment in New York.4 2 In fact, the concept
of home rule for cities was deeply embedded in the pattern of municipal government long before the term "home rule" became current.
V. CONCLUSION
THE problem of disproportionate representation does not come
from the exclusion of aliens from the count used in apportioning
legislators. New York City's citizen population, with all aliens excluded, is over 50 per cent of the state's total. These city citizens
are now short-changed by the allotment to the city of but 43.1 per cent
of the State Senators and 43.4 per cent of the Assemblymen.
So far as the Senate is concerned, two clauses in the State Constitution cause the greatest injustice of its basic premise that the legislative districts "shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of
inhabitants, excluding aliens." One, intended to protect the smaller
flowing in upon it from foreign lands." 3 Rev. Record, 1894, Constitutional Convention, 390 (1900).
41 Messages from the Governors, 100-01 (Lincoln Ed., 1909).
42 Even before the 1894 Constitution, a measure of local autonomy was assured
to municipalities through Art. X, § 2, of the 1874 Constitution, carried down in amended
form from the 1846 Constitution, which provided that existing offices filled by local
appointing powers must continue to be so filled.
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counties' representation, requires that the total of fifty Senators
established by the 1894 Constitution shall be increased by those
Senators to which any of the larger counties become entitled in addition to their allotment as of 1894, but without effect for decreases in
other large counties.
The latest apportionment raised the Senate total from 56 to 58
because Kings, Queens and Nassau Counties became entitled to eight
more Senators than they had in 1894. Yet New York and Bronx
Counties now have two less Senators than in 1894. As a result, the
Senate seat which was taken from the Bronx, instead of serving to
offset the increase of one given Queens, with no change in the total,
was given upstate Onondaga County. Because Onondaga has only
three out of the 150 State Assemblymen, one of the two Senate
Districts thus allotted Onondaga is so small as to be at one and the
same time an Assembly District.
The other constitutional provision which prevents fair Senate
representation is the one prohibiting any county from having four or
more Senators unless for each it has a full ratio, obtained by dividing
the state's inhabitants, excluding aliens, by fifty. This ratio under
the 1950 census is 284,069. As an example, Bronx County, with a
citizen population of 1,136,276, is limited to four Senators, without
consideration for the 241,905 citizens remaining over four full ratios.
At the same time, Onondaga's citizen population of 334,453 is given
an extra Senator for its 50,384 remainder over one full ratio. It is
apparent that a fair approach would allot any Senators remaining
after the allocation on full ratios to the counties with the highest
remainders, in the order thereof.
So far as the Assembly is concerned, the basic cause for inequality
of representation is the constitutional provision that every county except Hamilton, the smallest, shall always be entitled to at least one
member. Using the latest census figures, twenty-three counties, each
entitled to one Assemblyman, have populations of less than 50 per cent
of the ratio obtained by dividing the state's inhabitants, excluding
aliens, by the total number of Assemblymen. As a matter of fact,
five of these counties have populations of less than one-quarter of
the ratio. Because of the constitutional requirement of allotting one
of the fixed number of 150 Assemblymen to each of these underpopulated counties it is impossible to give the larger counties the
seats to which the ratio would otherwise entitle them.
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One suggested solution for doing away with this unfair situation
for the resulting inequality would be to increase the total number of
Assemblymen, as was done in 1894. The 1950 citizen population is
145 per cent more than that of 1892, as compared with the 140 per
cent rise over 1845 which led to the 1894 increase from 128 to 150.
An Assembly of 253 would eliminate the grossest discrepancies by
giving every county entitled to a seat at least one-quarter of the ratio
obtained by dividing the total citizen population by 253, while the
number of such counties with less than half the ratio would be reduced
43
from twenty-three to six.

Another proposed solution would involve some further abandonment of the principle of separate representation for each county.
That would involve increasing the size of the Assembly to 181 members and at the same time making one district out of the second and
third smallest counties, Schuyler and Yates, which are contiguous.
The result would be that each Assembly District in the state would
have at least one-quarter of the ratio obtained by dividing the state's
4
total citizen population by 181. 1
43 Letter to Editor, New York Times, Jan. 2, 1954, p. 10, from Robert J. Levinsohn,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Apportionment, The New York Young Democratic Club,
Inc. See, also, letter to Editor, New York Times, Nov. 17, 1953, p. 30, from Herbert
Prasker, Robert J. Levinsohn, John S. Stillman, Joseph Cohen, Louise Farr, Madeline
Hunting, Margot Gayle.
44 A bill embodying this idea was introduced by the author in the 1955 session
of the New York State Legislature. Intro. No. 3014, Print. No. 4054. The bill was
drafted by Robert J. Levinsohn, Chairman, Subcommittee on Apportionment, The New
York Young Democratic Club, Inc.

